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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of
an auto-pedestrian accident when an automobile driven by
defendant, Jolene Jaye Simons, struck the plaintiff, Judith
Johnson.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

From a verdict and judg-

ment for the plaintiffs, the defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the jury verdict and judgment,
or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant-appellant, Jolene Jaye Simons, while driving
a car owned by her father, Dan C. Simons, with his knowledge
and consent (Tr. 15) struck plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson,
a pedestrian. At the time of the accident, both the defendant
driver and the plaintiff victim were sixteen (16) years old.
Defendant, Jolene Jaye Simons, prior to trial had married,
and was known as Jolene Jaye McBride.

She is referred to in

the trial transcript as Mrs. McBride.
The evidence at trial showed that the accident occurred
on January 13, 1973, at approximately six o'clock (6:00) P.M.,
near 6350 South Highland Drive, in Salt Lake County, Utah,
while the plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson, was standing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(2)
off the roadway and west of Highland Drive and southbound
traffic.

There were no sidewalks, no crosswalks or traffic

control devices in the area, however, at or near the place
where defendants' car struck the plaintiff, the area that
comprised the shoulder of the roadway, had been asphalted to
the west edge of the roadway, some distance north and south of
the entrance to the Monte Cristo Condominiums.

The area as-

phalted was approximately ten to fifteen feet wide, and gave
the appearance of an additional lane of traffic southbound.
(Tr. 8, 95). Street lighting was minimal with an additional
light on the Monte Cristo Condominiums sales office located a
short distance south and west of the area where the plaintiff,
Judith Johnson, had been struck by the defendants1 automobile.
Lighting in that area was such that Mr. Johnson could observe
chalk marks and found small pieces of clothing without the aid
of a flashlight.

(Tr. 39-40).

Oncoming traffic was heavy,

northbound as well as southbound, the direction defendantappellant was travelling.

Defendant testified that just before

impact she had looked in her rear view mirror and saw several
cars behind her and noticed at least one car directly in front
of her? that she glanced down at her speedometer, but could
not recall her exact speed, but thought she was travelling about
30 miles per hour, when she looked up and saw an object which
she hit.

(Tr. 20-26) . Defendant did not perceive it was a

person, did not swerve to avoid striking the object, and did
not apply her brakes, except to stop and pull off the road into
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a driveway a considerable distance south of the place she
first struck the object,

(Tr. 24-25).

Defendant then

attempted to back her car up to see what she had hit, and
nearly collided with Deputy Sheriff Green, who was unaware
of the accident and had been travelling two or three cars
behind the Simons vehicle. There was no evidence as to how
far behind the Simons vehicle Deputy Green was travelling.
Mark Simons, the older of the two younger brothers of Jolene
McBride discovered that the object hit was the plaintiff,
Judith Johnson.

He was in the right front seat at the time

of the collision.

(Tr. 25-26, 32). The two younger brothers

of defendant, Jolene Simons, were the only other witnesses
to the accident, but they were not called to testify.
Plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson, at the time of the
accident, was wearing a bright red parka.

(Tr. 33, 40). The

roadway was wet, but the weather was clear. Mrs. McBride
testified that she had not observed snow until after she had
stopped (Tr. 27); that her car lights were on, in good condition and working; that the lights on the car immediately
in front of her (approximately one (1) car length) were working; that her visability was not obstructed or obscured in any
manner; and the lights from the oncoming cars, as well as the
cars in front and behind her, illuminated the area.

(Tr. 23,

26, 28, 79).
Plaintiff-respondent, Judith Johnson, suffered traumatic
amnesia as a result of her injuries, and had no memory of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(4)
accident, and for several days after the accident.
64).

(Tr. 63-

Miss Johnson testified that she recalled going to a

friend's house on the afternoon of the accident.

That she

had walked home from her friend's house on prior occasions
and would normally cross Highland Drive somewhere between the
field and the Monte Cristo Condominiums so as to avoid having
to negotiate Highland Drive where it is four-lanes north of the
accident scene.

(Tr. 72-74).

The driver, Mrs. McBride, testi-

fied that she was familiar with the area, had driven by there
before, had observed pedestrians in that area as late as the
date of the accident, and knew that pedestrians walked along
that stretch of the roadway.

(Tr. 22). That at the precise

moment of impact, the pedestrian appeared to be standing still,
and was definitely to the right of her automobile.

(Tr. 35).

The driver, Mrs. McBride, testified that she was in the center
of the southbound lane of traffic, near the center line, following directly behind the vehicle in front of her, one (1) car
length behind, approximately fifteen feet.

Mr. Lord, plain-

tiffs' expert, testified that this was highly unlikely, and that
the driver had changed the direction of her automobile from a
straight-ahead to a left-to-right movement directly at the
pedestrian, prior to impact.

(Tr. 122-124).

Mr. Knight, de-

fendants' expert, also testified that the Simons vehicle was
in a different direction of travel than the car in front of
her, and would have been to the right of the car immediately
in front of her.

(Tr. 162-164).
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The evidence presented at trial indicated that the impact
with the pedestrian occurred some place north of the driveway
and west of the roadway in the asphalted area of the shoulder
and driveway of the Monte Cristo Condominiums.

The initial

point of contact with the automobile was twelve (12) inches
in on the right bumper; and that the victim travelled in a
direct line over the car.

That the pedestrian, at the time

she was struck, was standing facing east. Mr. Lord testified
that the probable point of impact was north of where the body
of the pedestrian actually came to rest on the snowbank, and
west of the road.

The "exact" point he could not determine.

(Tr. 123-130).
Mr. Lord, plaintiffs' expert, testified that the seeable
distance of the automobile with lights on low beam is 150
feet; and on high beam 300 feet for an object on the road for
proper alignment.

That the pedestrian, Miss Johnson, standing

at the edge of the roadway could be seen much farther than 150
feet than an object laying on the roadway.
Plaintiffs-respondents take issue with the statement contained in the brief of defendants-appellants under the heading
"Statement of Facts" on page 4, where they state their expert
witness, Newell K. Knight, testified that the physical evidence
would just as easily support the conclusion that the pedestrian
was well into the travelled portion of the highway when hit,
and refers to the transcript, pages 149-155. A reading of the
testimony of Mr. Knight in the transcript at those pages clearly
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reveals that Mr. Knight made no such statement.

In fact,

Mr. Knight testified that in a low speed accident, such as
this accident, the pedestrian would move in the opposite
direction of the force and could actually tumble and come
almost to the spot where the pedestrian was originally when
struck.

(Tr. 152-153) . This clearly would establish the

position of the pedestrian at or near the place where she was
found west of and off the roadway in the asphalted area of the
driveway in front of the Monte Cristo Condominiums.
Plaintiffs-respondents also take issue with the statement
of the defendants-appellants contained in their brief under the
heading "Statement of Facts" on pages 4 and 5 thereof, that the
lower court approved the right to make a record at a later time
of counsel's exceptions to the jury instructions given by the
court.

On page 167 of the transcript, Mr. Poelman made his

exceptions into the record, after the jury had retired to deliberate.

In the supplemental transcript of the proceedings

held before the lower court on October 6, 197 5, Judge Sawaya
was under the impression that counsel for defendants-appellants
had not had opportunity to make objections to the instructions
of the court. The court was informed that Mr. Poelman had in
fact had opportunity and had taken advantage of the opportunity
and had made exceptions as shown by the transcript, pages 167169.

The supplemental transcript does not indicate that Judge

Sawaya in fact entered an order or granted leave to counsel for
defendants-appellants to make additional exceptions to the instructions given and not given.

(Supp. Tr. 28-30).
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO GIVE DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19 WAS, IF
ANYTHING, HARMLESS ERROR, AND NOT PREJUDICIAL TO
DEFENDANTS' CASE WHERE THE INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN IN
SUBSTANCE, MEETS THE REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW, AND THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE INSTRUCTION WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE
JURY.
Counsel for appellants urge that the alleged failure of
the trial court to give the first part of the second sentence
of its requested jury instruction number 19 was prejudicial
error.

The proffered instruction reads thus:
"One who is guilty of contributory negligence
may not recover from another for any injury
suffered." (R. 92).

Failure to give this instruction to the jury at all might have
been prejudicial error, but it is acknowledged that the instruction was given in substance.

(Appellants1 brief, page 5).

That a jury instruction need only be given in substance is
clear from cases cited by appellants. A close reading of
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, 166
(1929), reveals that the court's actual holding was to the
effect that the defendant was entitled to the substance of a
contributory negligence instruction.

In that case, the de-

fendants' proffered instructions on contributory negligence
were inaccurate statements of law, but the Court held that
they should have been given anyway, because they were the law
in substance.
Appellants quote from page 194 of Case v. Peterson, 17
Wash.2d 523, 136 P.2d 192 (1934), to the effect that the Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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must define for the jury what contributory negligence is and
what its effect should be on the verdict.

It was further

stated that it was error for the Court to not so instruct the
jury.

More interesting, however, is the paragraph directly

following:
"If the question rested here, we think the
appellant would have good cause for complaint,
but in view of other instructions given, the
appellant was not prejudiced. " (Emphasis Added).
The similarity to the instant case is striking.

The actual

instructions given in that case may be found on page 194, and
those instructions, which were deemed sufficient, were probably
not even as clear as those given in the instant case.

(R. 126-

163) (R. 36) .
Appellants seek to have the court consider the content of
two affidavits attached to their brief as Appendix A and Appendix B.

For reasons that will appear later, the statements

found in those affidavits may not be used to impeach jury's verdict.

Nevertheless, the content of those affidavits seem to

suggest that the jurors did substantially understand the law
of contributory negligence.

It is true, there is some evidence

of confusion, but there is also much evidence to the contrary.
In Appendix A, juror, Galen R. Coles, states his firm
belief that none of the jurors understood the consequence of a
finding of contributory negligence (paragraph 5).

Besides the

fact that this is inadmissible hearsay—Rule 56 (e) of the Utah
Rules of Evidence—it is clear from Appendix B affidavit (the
enitre substantive content of which is also inadmissible), that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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his firm belief was simply erroneous.

In paragraph 11, speak-

ing of juror, Wayne Croft, Mr. Poelman says:
"He further stated that he understood the instructions of the court to mean that if she was
contributorily negligent no award of damages
should be made to the plaintiffs, but that he
disregarded that instruction and made an award of
damages anyway because he knew that Miss Johnson
had suffered a great deal."
This juror unquestionably understood the law to be applied.
Of perhaps even greater significance is the fact that he
understood this from "the instructions of the court" and not
from any independent understanding of the law, strongly suggesting that the instructions were adequate.

Paragraph 10 is

also instructive:
"I phoned him at home that evening and he said
that he had come to the conclusion that the
jury had not followed the instructions of the
court and he felt terrible about it."
Far from showing that the jurors did not understand the law,
and the instructions, these two excerpts demonstrate that they
did understand.

Paragraph 10 is especially interesting be-

cause it involves a purported telephone conversation with
juror, Galen R. Coles, the affiant of the affidavit of Appendix
A.

The claimed conversation took place on September 15, 1975,

at which time he stated that the jury had not followed the
court's instructions.

Three days later, in the taking of the

affidavit, things were slightly different. Now the jury is
said to have not understood the court's instructions, which is
a substantial deviation from the first statement indeed, and
tends to cast a shadow over both documents.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the affidavit of Appendix B, paragraph 8, the statement of Karen L. Cannon is also instructive:
"When I asked her whether she was aware that
no money award should have been granted if
both parties were negligent, she said that she
and one of the male jurors thought that was the
instruction and asked about it; that the jury
foreman looked through the instructions and
couldn't find anything to that effect; . . ."
It is unfortunate that the discussion that took place in the
jury room at that time is not available in its entirety.

As

previously noted, juror, Wayne Croft, fully understood the
instruction and the law, and it is hard to believe that while
the jury foreman was looking through the instructions, Mr.
Croft would say nothing.
It is acknowledged that the affidavits contain some evidence
of misunderstanding, but the evidence that the jurors understood
is at least as strong, if not stronger.

At best, the affidavits

are inconclusive of the proposition that the instructions were
inadequate, and are an attempt to impeach the jury's verdict
contrary to law.

(See memorandum of plaintiffs-respondents,

R. 41-46).
Where, as in this case, the language of the instructions
to the jury is such that the issues are understandable, and
facts are ascertainable to resolve issues, the trial court's
failure to give instructions requested by defendants will not
constitute reversible error.
417 P.2d 246 (1966).

(Shupe v. Menlove, 18 U.2d 130,

The record shows the issues in this case

were understandable and the factual evidence was ascertainable
to resolve the issues. Thus, the failure to give defendantsDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appellants requested instruction, was at most, if anything,
harmless error, and did not constitute reversible error.
Lamb v. Bangart,

U.2d

In

, 525 P.2d 602 (1974), the Court

said:
"Although in any lawsuit of several days duration
counsel can usually find matters upon which he
may claim error, reviewing court will not reverse
on mere error but only if it be substantial and
prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable likelihood that unfairness or injustice has
resulted."
Both parties had fair and full opportunity to present their
contentions and evidence supporting them to the court and the
jury.

Both parties had sufficient opportunity to make excep-

tions in the record to the instructions given or not given,
and all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict
and judgment.

(Rowley v. Graven Brothers, 26 U.2d 448, 491

P.2d 1206; Burnson v. Strong, 17 U.2d 364, 412 P.2d 451; Gordon
v. Provo City, 15 U.2d 287, 319 P.2d 430).
In reviewing the record as a whole, the failure of the
trial court to give defendants-appellants requested instruction
was not error; or if considered to be error, was at most, harmless error.

The verdict of the jury should not be overturned

and should be affirmed.
POINT II
A JURY MAY NOT IMPEACH ITS VERDICT BY AFFIDAVIT.
The law in Utah on jury impeachment by affidavit is set
forth in Rule 59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as
follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one
or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or
to a finding on any question submitted to them
by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance, or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any
one of the jurors."
In the instant case, there is no claim of a determination by chance, nor is there any claim of bribery.

The statute

says nothing of allowing a jury to impeach its verdict on the
basis of the deliberations or mental processes of jury members.
It is clear then that this case does not come within the purview of the statute.
The law on the subject is further delineated by Rule 41
of the Utah Rules of Evidence as follows:
"Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict
or an indictment no evidence shall be received
to show the effect of any statement, conduct,
event or condition upon the mind of a juror as
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning the mental
processes by which it was determined, except as
provided in Rule 59, U.R.C.P."
That the statutory grounds alone can be invoked as an exception
to the general rule, and that the deliberations and mental processes of the jurors cannot be inquired into, is also clear
from the case law. In Hathway v. Marx, 21 U.2d 33, 439 P.2d
850, 851 (1968), the Court said in language that seems appropriate in the present case the following:
"First, there is no competent proof that the
alleged misconduct happened at all. Second,
with very limited exceptions, the conduct and
deliberations in the jury room cannot be impeached. "
See also Elite Cleaners and Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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784 (1973).

An expecially interesting case is Santilli v.

Pueblo, 511 P.2d 928, 929 (Col. Ct. App. 1973), which involved
an omitted instruction, must like the present case, and its
omission was deemed by the Court to be harmless error. Actually,
the similarities between that case and this case, although the
cases are not identical, are striking.

In reaching its de-

cision, the Court had this to say:
"Following the trial, one of the jurors gave the
Santillis' attorney an affidavit stating that
the jury as a whole, during its deliberations,
was confused in applying some of the law to
portions of the facts. Such an affidavit is not
grounds for the granting of a new trial or for a
reversal of the judgment entered. A verdict cannot be impeached by the affidavit of a juror."
Respondents do not understand appellants' reliance on the
cases cited on pages 15-17 of their brief.

A casual reading

of those cases shows that they do not support appellants1 position at all. The excerpt from Moulton v. Staats, 83 Utah 197,
27 P.2d 455 (1933) found on page 15 of appellants' brief, reveals that his case did not even involve an impeachment of a
jury verdict.

Actually, the reason the verdict was modified

in that case was because it had not been correctly expressed
by the jury.

The agreement reached by the jury did not agree

with the written paper filed.

Since in the present case,

appellants have made no claim that there was a mistake in
transmission, nor are appellants asking for mere modification
of the verdict, the cited case is plainly inapplicable. Appellants' quote from Brown v. Johnson, 24 U.2d 388, 472 P.2d 942
(1970) merely reaffirms this.

An affidavit from a juror may
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explain a verdict, but it cannot impeach it.
Appellants next cite Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 366
P.2d 701, 703-04 (1961).

That case clearly stands for the

proposition that a trial court, in its discretion, may order
a new trial when it appears that, "it seems clear that the jury
has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence ***."

The criteria ob-

served on appellate review are not the same as those on the
trial court level. This is stated precisely in this case:
"The trial court has a broad discretion in ruling
on such a motion which we should not disturb
unless there is a plain abuse thereof. We apply
a different rule in determining whether this
court on appeal should grant a new trial and
whether the trial court abused its discretion in
granting a new trial."
The Court had this to say on the rule to be applied on reviewing lower court rulings on motions for new trial:
"However, since the trial judge has seen and heard
the witnesses and had a first-hand view of all of
the evidence, and the proceedings throughout the
trial and has ruled on the admissibility of the
evidence, and instructed the jury on the law governing their verdict, and had opportunity of
observing the tactics of the counsel throughout
the trial and the jury's reaction thereto, his
ruling on a motion for a new trial should not be
overruled unless it clearly appears that he has
abused his discretion."
Finally, it should be noted that this case also did not involve
impeachment of a jury verdict, but rather, a motion for a new
trial because it was felt that the jury's verdict went against
the weight of the evidence.
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Of all the cases cited in this portion of appellants'
brief, the case of Hunter v. Smallwood, 328 N.E.2d 344 (111.
App. 1975) comes closest to being in point.

But a close read-

ing, and a comparison with the facts of the present case, show
that it likewise does not offer appellants much confort.
First, the portion omitted from appellants' brief:
"The sensitive jury deliberations and the thought
processes of the jury should not be thrown out in
the open and picked apart, otherwise no trial
would ever be safe from attack."
Second, it should be noted that this case was decided by an
inferior court of another state.

Third, it would seem that

this case stands for the proposition that two exceptions to
the rule against jury impeachment of a verdict are (1) where
the jury is hopelessly confused, and (2) where the verdict as
recorded did not agree with the verdict reached.

As to point

(1), a reading of the affidavits in a light most favorable to
appellants does not show hopeless confusion.

At best, such a

reading shows that some of the jurors at one time raised a
question about the meaning of the instructions.

It might well

be asked, what jury doesn't experience some confusion at some
point during their deliberations?

As to point (2), it cannot

be said of the present case that the verdict rendered and recorded does not agree with the one agreed upon.

In the cited

case, the jurors' affidavits showed that the jury intended to
deny recovery, but granted recovery instead.

In the present

case, appellants assert that the jury reached its verdict as a
result of a misunderstanding of the law, which is quite a
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different thing indeed.
At the outset of Point III of appellants1 brief, appellants
acknowledge that the instant case comes within the rules governing impeachment of jury verdicts by affidavit.

It is alleged

that the cases cited illustrate examples of exceptions to the
rules.

That there are exceptions is not questioned.

Respondents

simply maintain that three of the four cases cited have nothing
to do with impeachment, and the exceptions noted in the fourth
case are inapplicable in the instant case.

The evidence in

this case clearly supported the verdict of the jury and the
verdict was not predicated upon misconduct of the jury or by
resort to a determination by chance.
POINT III
APPELLANTS WERE NOT PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S
ALLEGED FAILURE TO READ JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1-A
TO THE JURY.
Appellants claim prejudicial error through the trial court's
clerical oversight in not reading the instruction on passion and
prejudice to the jury.

To sustain this point, it would appear

that appellants must prove two (2) things. First, they must
show that the jury was denied the instruction, and second,
they must show that such denial was prejudicial to their case,
or else it must be dismissed as harmless error.

It appears from

both the transcript and the case law that appellants can meet
neither burden.
That a failure or refusal to give instructions may be
cured or waived seems to be the law.

89 C.J.S. Trial §671 (1955).
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Appellants called the oversight to the courtfs attention, and
agreed that their own (appellants) reading of the instruction
would be sufficient.

(Appellants1 brief, page 21).

A closely

related case is Rosics v. Grant, 174 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div.
1958), wherein the court, in ruling on a similar issue said:
"After the court had finished its instruction
to the jury, the attorney for the defendant
took exception to that part of the charge and
the court immediately explained to the jury
that the wording was improper and that they
should use their common sense, after which court
said to counsel "Does that take care of that?
Mr. Kramer: Yes. The court: All right." Under
these circumstances the defendant has no justifiable complaint with reference to that part of
the case."
In the instant case, the appellants' counsel agreed that his
own reading of the instruction would "take care of that", and
there is no reason why the outcome should be any different.
(Supp. Tr. 3). It is a recognized rule of law that a party
who takes a position which either leads a court into error, or
by conduct approves the error committed by the court, cannot
later take advantage of such error in procedure. (Helman v.
Patterson, 121 Utah 332, 241 P.2d 910, 913; Ludlow v. Colorado
Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347, 354).
Defendants-appellants were in complete agreement with the manner
in which the lower court submitted instruction 1-A, and cannot
now be heard to complain.
Our inquiry might easily end here, but the cases on passion
and prejudice are very revealing. A perceptive reading of those
cases show that passions and prejudice always goes to the issue
of amount of damages and is a question of liability.
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appellants have not alleged that the amount of damages is
excessive in the present case, it would appear that their
argument must fail as a matter of law. A few cases from other
jurisdictions are here cited.

Schaefer v. Trans American

Freight Lines, 173 S.W.2d 20, 23 (1943); Tunnel Mining and
Leasing Company v. Cooper, 115 P. 901, 903 (1911); Ries v.
Cheyenne Cabin Transfer Company, 79 P.2d 468, 474 (1938).
Utah is no exception, thus, in Hansen v. General Builders
Supply Company, 15 U.2d 143, 389 P.2d 61, 62 (1964), the Court
said:
"General damages of $22,500.00 were awarded by
the jury, which to you or me might seem somewhat
exaggerated, and, depending on any one elses personal opinion, may have been poor judgment on the
part of the veniremen. The urgence on appeal, however, is that the verdict reflected passion and
prejudice against the defendants. There is nothing in the record that would justify this court
in arriving at such a conclusion."
Should we be overly surprised to find that this is exactly
what the pertinent Utah Statute says on the subject?

Rule 59

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs new trials. As
grounds for new trials, 59(a) (5) reads as follows:
"Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion
and prejudice."
The jury was given the instruction on passion and prejudice,
appellants acquiesced in the manner in which the instruction was
given, and no prejudice was shown, since it is not alleged that
damages were excessive, in that the matter of passion and prejudice goes only to damages by case law and by statute. Appellants
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should be granted neither reversal nor new trial on this point.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED NEITHER TO SUBMIT THE
ISSUES TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT, NOR TO SUMMON
A JURY PANEL, NOR TO GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
Appellants cite the case of Baker v. Cook, 6 U.2d 161,
308 P.2d 264, 267 (1957) in the brief on page 14 to an effect
that a special verdict should be used in some cases. This
does no violence to the principal that the decision rests
with the trial court, to be overturned only on a clear showing
of abuse of the court's discretion.

Whether or not there was

any such abuse should be determined from the record and the
previous points of law discussed in this brief.

There has been

no showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court
by appellants.
CONCLUSION
The alleged failure of the trial court to give defendants1
requested instruction did not constitute reversible error, and
was, if anything, harmless error and not prejudicial to defendants1 case where the instruction was given in substance; met the
requirements of law; and the substance of the instruction was
understood by the jury.

The evidence in this case clearly sup-

ports the verdict and the verdict is not predicated upon misconduct of the jury; or by resort to a determination by chance;
or the awarding of excessive damages appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion and prejudice. Therefore,
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the request of defendants-appellants to summon the jury panel
in connection with their motion for new trial was nothing more
than an attempt to impeach the jury verdict by affidavits of
the jurors, which was clearly contrary to law; and the refusal
of the lower court to summon the jury panel and to grant the
motion for new trial was proper and not error. Defendantsappellants1 approval of the manner in which the lower court submitted instruction 1-A to the jury, and their own reading of
the instruction to the jury, leaves them without justifiable
complaint, and certainly without claim of error on the part of
the lower court.

The refusal of the lower court to submit the

issues to the jury on special verdict was discretionary, and
where there has been no showing of abuse of discretion, all
presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict and
the judgment.

The verdict and the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
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